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Abstract— This paper is focused on the cross-layer design
problem of joint multiuser detection and power control for
energy-efficiency optimization in a wireless data network through
a game-theoretic approach. Building on work of Meshkati, et al.,
wherein the tools of game-theory are used in order to achieve
energy-efficiency in a simple synchronous code division multiple
access system, system asynchronism, the use of bandlimited chip-
pulses, and the multipath distortion induced by the wireless
channel are explicitly incorporated into the analysis. Several
non-cooperative games are proposed wherein users may vary
their transmit power and their uplink receiver in order to
maximize their utility, which is defined here as the ratio of
data throughput to transmit power. In particular, the case in
which a linear multiuser detector is adopted at the receiver is
considered first, and then, the more challenging case in which
non-linear decision feedback multiuser detectors are employed
is considered. The proposed games are shown to admit a
unique Nash equilibrium point, while simulation results show
the effectiveness of the proposed solutions, as well as that the
use of a decision-feedback multiuser receiver brings remarkable
performance improvements. Index Terms— Power control, non-
cooperative games, energy-efficiency, CDMA, Multipath fading.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory [1] is a branch of mathematics that has
been applied primarily to social science and economics to
study the interactions among several autonomous subjects
with contrasting interests. Recently, it has been discovered
that it can also be used for the design and analysis of
communication systems, mostly with application to resource
allocation algorithms [2], and, in particular, to power control
[3]. As examples, the reader is referred to [4], [5]. Here,
for a multiple access wireless data network, noncooperative
and cooperative games are introduced, wherein users choose
their transmit powers in order to maximize their own utilities,
defined as the ratio of the throughput to transmit power. While
the above studies consider the issue of power control assuming
that a conventional matched filter is available at the receiver,
the recent paper [6] considers for the first time the problem
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of joint linear receiver design and power control so as to
maximize the utility of each user. In particular, it is shown
here that the inclusion of receiver design in the considered
game brings remarkable advantages, and, also, results based
on the powerful large-system analysis are presented.
All of the cited studies, while laying the foundations of
the game-theoretic approach to utility maximization in wire-
less data networks, focus on a very simple model, i.e. a
synchronous direct sequence code division multiple access
(DS/CDMA) channel subject to flat-fading. In this paper,
instead, we extend the game-theoretic framework to a more
practical and challenging scenario, namely we explicitly take
into account (a) the possible system asynchrony across users;
(b) the use of bandlimited chip-pulses; and (c) the multipath
distortion induced by the wireless propagation channel. Note
that in such a scenario intersymbol and interchip interference
arises, thus implying that the appealing mathematical rela-
tionships between the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio
(SINR) and the transmit power (as revealed in [6]) do not
hold any longer, and this makes system analysis much more
involved than it is for the case in which no self-interference
exists. A further contribution of this paper is the consideration
of non-linear multiuser receivers. Indeed, while previous stud-
ies have considered the case in which either a matched filter
(see, e.g., [5]) or a linear multiuser detector [6] is adopted at
the uplink receiver, here we also consider the case in which
a non-linear decision feedback receiver is employed at the
receiver.
Notation: (·)T denotes transpose, while ∗ and × denote linear
convolution and ordinary product, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider the uplink of an asynchronous DS/CDMA system
with K users, employing bandlimited chip pulses and oper-
ating over a frequency-selective fading channel. The received
signal at the access point (AP) may be written as1
r(t) =
B−1∑
p=0
K∑
k=1
√
pkbk(p)s
′
k(t−τk−pTb)∗ck(t)+w(t) . (1)
1For the sake of simplicity we assume here a real signal model; however,
the extension to complex signals to account for I and Q components is trivial.
2In the above expression, B is the transmitted frame or packet
length, Tb is the bit-interval duration, pk and τk ≥ 0 denote
the transmit power and timing offset of the k-th user, bk(p) ∈
{+1,−1} is the k-th user’s information symbol in the p-
th signaling interval (extension to modulations with a larger
cardinality is straightforward). Moreover, ck(t) is the impulse
response modeling the channel effects between the receiver
and the k-th user’s transmitter, while w(t) is the additive
noise term, which is assumed to be a zero-mean, Wide-
Sense Stationary (WSS) white Gaussian process with Power
Spectral Density (PSD) N0/2. It is also assumed that the
channel coherence time exceeds the packet duration BTb, so
that the channel impulse responses c0(t), . . . , cK−1(t) may be
assumed to be time-invariant over each transmitted frame. As
to s′k(t), it is the k-th user’s signature waveform and is written
as s′k(t) =
N−1∑
n=0
β
(n)
k hSRRC(t−nTc), with {β(n)k }N−1n=0 the k-th
user’s spreading sequence, N the processing gain, Tc = Tb/N
the chip interval, and hSRRC(·) a square-root raised cosine
waveform with roll-off factor α ∈ [0, 1]. We assume here that
hSRRC(t) is zero outside the interval [0, 4Tc] and attains its
maximum value in t = 2Tc.
The receiver front-end consists of a filter with impulse
response hSRRC(−t), followed by a sampler at rate M/Tc;
in our simulations we will assume that M = 2. Denoting by
y(t) the signal at the output of the receiver matched filter, it
can be easily shown that
y(t) = r(t) ∗ hSRRC(−t) =
B−1∑
p=0
K∑
k=1
√
pkbk(p)×
sk(t− τk − pTb) ∗ ck(t) + w(t) ∗ hSRRC(−t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n(t)
,
(2)
with sk(t) = s′k(t) ∗ hSRRC(−t) =
N−1∑
n=0
β
(n)
k hRC(t − nTc),
and hRC(t) = hSRRC(t) ∗ hSRRC(−t).
Denoting by hk(t) = sk(t−τk)∗ck(t) the effective signature
waveform for the k-th user in the p-th signaling interval, the
signal (2) can be expressed as
y(t) =
B−1∑
p=0
K∑
k=1
√
pkbk(p)hk(t− pTb) + n(t) . (3)
Notice that the waveform hk(t) is supported in the interval
[τk, τk + Tb + Tm + 7Tc], where Tm denotes the maximum
channel multipath delay spread over the K active users.
Assuming that τk + Tm < Tb, the support of the waveform
hk(t−pTb) is contained in the interval [pTb, (p+2)Tb+7Tc],
thus implying that, for a system with processing gain larger
than 7, in the symbol interval Ip = [pTb, (p + 2)Tb] the
contribution from at most four symbols for each user (i.e. the
p-th, the (p − 1)-th, the (p − 2)-th and the (p + 1)-th ones)
is observed. Accordingly, sampling the waveform y(t) at rate
M/Tc, the 2MN -dimensional vector y(p) collecting the data
samples of the interval Ip can be expressed as
y(p) =
K∑
k=1
√
pk [bk(p− 2)hk,−2 + bk(p− 1)hk,−1+
bk(p)hk,0 + bk(p+ 1)hk,+1] + n(p) .
(4)
In (4), the vector hk,i is 2MN -dimensional, and contains the
samples of the signature hk(t − (p + i)Tb) coming from Ip,
while the vector n(p) contains the noise contribution, and
is a Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix M . We
assume that the data vector y(p) will be used in order to detect
the information symbols b1(p), b2(p), . . . , bK(p), i.e. the p-th
epoch data symbols for all the users.
Assume now that each mobile terminal is interested both
in having its data received with as small as possible error
probability at the AP, and in making optimal use of the energy
stored in its battery. Obviously, these are conflicting goals,
since error-free reception may be achieved by increasing the
received SNR, i.e. by increasing the transmit power, which of
course comes at the expense of battery life2. A useful approach
to quantify these conflicting goals is to define the utility of the
k-th user as the ratio of its throughput, defined as the number
of information bits that are received with no error in the unit
time, to its transmit power [4], [5], i.e.
uk =
Tk
pk
. (5)
Note that uk is measured in bits/Joule. Denoting by R the
common rate of the network and assuming that each packet
of B bits contains L information bits and B−L overhead bits,
reserved, e.g., for channel estimation and/or parity checks, the
throughput Tk can be expressed as
Tk = R
L
B
Pk (6)
wherein Pk denotes the probability that a packet from the k-
th user is received error-free. In the considered DS/CDMA
setting, the term Pk depends formally on a number of pa-
rameters such as the spreading codes of all the users, their
transmit powers and their channel impulse responses; however,
a customary approach is to model the overall interference as a
Gaussian random process, and assume that Pk is an increasing
function of the k-th user’s SINR γk, which is a good model
for many practical scenarios.
For the case in which a linear receiver is used to detect the
data symbol bk(p), according, i.e., to the decision rule
b̂k(p) = sign
[
dTk y(p)
]
, (7)
with b̂k(p) the estimate of bk(p) and dk the 2NM -dimensional
vector representing the receive filter for user k, it is easily seen
2Of course there are many other strategies to lower the data error prob-
ability, such as for example the use of error correcting codes, diversity
exploitation, and implementation of optimal reception techniques at the
receiver. Here, however, we are mainly interested in energy efficient data
transmission and power usage, so we assume that only the transmit power
and the receiver strategy can be varied to achieve energy efficiency.
3that for the case at hand the SINR γk can be written as
γk =
pk(d
T
k hk,0)
2
dTkMdk +
∑
i6=k
1∑
j=−2
pi(d
T
k hi,j)
2 +
∑
j 6=0
pk(d
T
k hk,j)
2
.
(8)
The exact shape of Pk(γk) depends not only on γk, but
also on other factors such as the modulation and coding type.
However, in all cases of relevant interest, it is an increasing
function of γk with a sigmoidal shape, and converges to unity
as γk → +∞; as an example, for binary phase-shift-keying
(BPSK) modulation coupled with no channel coding, it is
easily shown that
Pk(γk) =
[
1−Q(
√
2γk)
]B
, (9)
with Q(·) the complementary cumulative distribution function
of a zero-mean random Gaussian variate with unit variance.
It should be noted however that substituting Eq. (9) into (6),
and, in turn, into (5), leads to a strong incongruence. Indeed,
for pk → 0, we have γk → 0, but Pk converges to a small but
non-zero value (i.e. 2−B), thus implying that an unboundedly
large utility can be achieved by transmitting with zero power.
To circumvent this problem, a customary approach [5], [6] is
to replace Pk with an efficiency function, say fk(γk), whose
behavior should approximate as close as possible that of Pk,
except that for γk → 0 it is required that fk(γk) = o(γk). The
function f(γk) = (1−e−γk/2)B is a widely accepted substitute
for the true probability of correct packet reception, and in the
following we will adopt this model. This efficiency function is
increasing and S-shaped, converges to unity as γk approaches
infinity, and has a continuous first order derivative3.
Summing up, substituting (6) into (5) and replacing the
probability Pk with the above defined efficiency function, we
obtain the following expression for the k-th user’s utility:
uk = R
L
B
f(γk)
pk
, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K . (10)
III. NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH LINEAR RECEIVERS
In what follows we illustrate three different noncooperative
games wherein each user aims at maximizing its own utility
by varying its transmit power, and, possibly, its linear uplink
receiver. Formally, the considered game G can be described as
the triplet G = [K, {Sk} , {uk}], wherein K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}
is the set of active users participating in the game, uk is the
k-th user’s utility defined in eq. (10), and
Sk = [0, Pk,max]×R2NM , (11)
is the set of possible actions (strategies) that user k can take.
It is seen that Sk is written as the Cartesian product of two
different sets, and indeed [0, Pk,max] is the range of available
transmit powers for the k-th user (note that Pk,max is the
maximum allowed transmit power of user k), while R2NM ,
with R the real line, defines the set of all possible linear
receive filters.
3Note that we have omitted the subscript k, i.e. we have used the notation
f(γk) in place of fk(γk) since we assume that the efficiency function is the
same for all the users.
A. Power control with plain matched filter
We first consider the case in which Sk = [0, Pk,max] and the
uplink receiver is a matched filter, i.e. we assume that each user
tunes its transmit power in order to maximize its own utility,
but the uplink receiver is a matched filter4. Consequently, the
k-th user’s SINR is expressed as
γk=
pk‖hk,0‖4
hTk,0Mhk,0+
∑
i6=k
1∑
j=−2
pi(h
T
k,0hi,j)
2+
∑
j 6=0
pk(h
T
k,0hk,j)
2
,
(12)
and the noncooperative game can be cast as the following
maximization problem
max
Sk
uk = max
pk∈[0,Pk,max]
uk(pk)= max
pk∈[0,Pk,max]
f(γk(pk))
pk
, (13)
∀k = 1, . . . ,K . Now, the following result can be stated about
maximization (13).
Proposition 1: The non-cooperative game defined in (13)
admits a unique Nash equilibrium point p∗k, for k = 1, . . . ,K ,
wherein p∗k = min{p¯k, Pk,max}, with p¯k denoting the k-th
user’s transmit power such that the k-th user’s SINR γk equals
γ¯k, i.e. the unique solution of the equation
B
2ak
γ(ak − bkγ) = exp(γ/2)− 1 , (14)
with ak = ‖hk,0‖4 and
bk =
∑
j 6=0
(hTk,0hk,j)
2.
Proof: The proof is omitted for brevity.
In summary, Proposition 1 states that a Nash equilibrium
for the noncooperative game (13) always exists, and it can be
found with the following steps. First, the unique solution γ¯k
of the equation (14) is determined. Then, each user adjusts its
transmit power to achieve its target SINR γ¯k. These steps are
repeated until convergence is reached.
B. Power control and receiver design with no ISI
Let us now consider the case in which not only the transmit
power, but also the linear receiver can be tuned so as to
maximize utility for each user; moreover, let us also impose the
condition that the receive filter be orthogonal to the subspace
spanned by ISI. Denoting by Ok a 2NM × (2NM − 3)-
dimensional matrix containing in its columns a basis for the
orthogonal complement of the subspace spanned by the k-
th user’s ISI, i.e. by the vectors hk,−2, hk,−1, and hk,1, we
assume that the decision rule to detect the symbol bk(p) can
be written as
b̂k(p) = sign
[
xTkO
T
k y(p)
]
, (15)
4Note that for an oversampling factor M > 1 a whitening transformation
would in principle be required prior to matched filtering; for the sake of
simplicity, however, noise whitening is not performed here.
4with xk a (2NM − 3)-dimensional vector. The k-th user’s
SINR is now written as
γk =
pk(x
T
kO
T
k hk,0)
2
xTkO
T
kMOkxk +
∑
i6=k
1∑
j=−2
pi(x
T
kO
T
k hi,j)
2
, (16)
namely the k-th user’s transmit power appears only in the
numerator in the RHS of (16), thus implying that the relation
dγk
dpk
= γkpk holds. We now consider the following maximization
problem
max
Sk
uk = max
pk,xk
uk(pk,xk) , ∀k = 1, . . . ,K . (17)
Given (10), the above maximization can be also written as
max
pk,xk
f(γk(pk,xk))
pk
= max
pk
f
(
max
xk
γk(pk,xk)
)
pk
, (18)
i.e. we can first take care of SINR maximization with respect
to linear receivers, and then focus on maximization of the
resulting utility with respect to transmit power. We now have
the following:
Proposition 2: Let Myy denote the covariance matrix of the
vector y(p). The non-cooperative game defined in (17) admits
a unique Nash equilibrium point (p∗k,x∗k), for k = 1, . . . ,K ,
wherein
- x∗k =
√
pk
(
OTkMyyOk
)−1
OTk hk,0 is the unique (up
to a positive scaling factor) k-th user’s receive filter that
maximizes the SINR γk in (16). Denote γ∗k = maxxk γk.
- p∗k = min{p¯k, Pk,max}, with p¯k the k-th user’s transmit
power such that the k-th user’s maximum SINR γ∗k equals
γ¯, i.e. the unique solution of the equation f(γ) = γf ′(γ),
with f ′(γ) denoting the derivative of f(γ).
Proof: The proof is omitted due to lack of space. Note however
that, due to the constraint that the receive filter is orthogonal
to the ISI contribution, the mathematical structure of the
maximization (17) is similar to that of the noncooperative
game proposed in [6], and the proof can thus be adapted from
there.
The above equilibrium can be reached according to the
following procedure. For a given set of users’ transmit powers,
the receiver filter coefficients can be set according to the
relation x∗k =
√
pk
(
OTkMyyOk
)−1
OTk hk,0; each user can
then tune its power so as to achieve the target SINR γ¯. These
steps are repeated until convergence is reached.
C. Power control and unconstrained receiver design
Finally, we consider the case in which no constraint is
imposed on the receive filter, so that the k-th user’s SINR
is written as in Eq. (8). We now consider the following
maximization
max
Sk
uk = max
pk,dk
uk(pk,dk) = max
pk
f
(
max
dk
γk(pk,dk)
)
pk
,
(19)
∀k = 1, . . . ,K , wherein the fact that the efficiency function
is non-decreasing has been exploited. Now, the maximization
of γk with respect to dk is trivial, since it is well known that
the linear receiver that maximizes SINR is the minimum mean
square error multiuser receiver. As a consequence, denoting by
d¯k the maximizer of γk, we have
d¯k =
√
pkM
−1
yyhk,0 ; (20)
let us denote by γ¯k(pk) the k-th user’s SINR with dk = d¯k.
Maximizing the utility with respect to the transmit power
requires instead solving the equation
f(γ¯k(pk)) = f
′(γ¯k(pk))γ¯
′
k(pk)pk , (21)
with (·)′ denoting first-order derivative with respect to pk.
Now, (21) appears to be quite complicated and unmanageable.
Indeed, note that letting Hk = [hk,−2 hk,−1 hk,1], we have
Myy = Myy(pk) = Qk + pkHkH
T
k + pkhk,0h
T
k,0 , (22)
with Qk the covariance matrix of the thermal noise and of
the multiuser interference for the k-th user, thus implying that
γ¯k(pk) is expressed as
γ¯k(pk) =
pk(h
T
k,0M
−1
yy(pk)hk,0)
2
hTk,0M
−1
yy(pk)hk,0 − pk(hTk,0M−1yy(pk)hk,0)2
.
(23)
It is clear that substituting (23) and its first-order derivative
into (21) and solving with respect to pk is quite complicated.
Accordingly, we have not been able in this case to formally
prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium point. However,
we have numerically evaluated the utility function and (21),
and we have found in every case considered that (21) admits
a unique solution and that the resulting game admits an
equilibrium point. We thus state the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1: The non-cooperative game defined in (19)
admits a unique Nash equilibrium point (p∗k,d
∗
k), for k =
1, . . . ,K , wherein
- d∗k is the linear MMSE receiver (see Eq. (20)), which
maximizes the SINR γk in (8). Denote γ¯k = maxdk γk.
- p∗k = min{p¯k, Pk,max}, with p¯k the unique solution of
Eq. (21).
Also in this case, the equilibrium can be reached through an
iterative procedure. For a given set of users’ transmit powers,
the receiver filter coefficients can be set equal to the MMSE
multiuser receiver; each user can then tune its power to p∗k,
and these steps are repeated until convergence is reached.
IV. NON-COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH
DECISION-FEEDBACK RECEIVERS
Consider now the case in which a non-linear decision
feedback receiver is used at the receiver. We assume that
the users are indexed according to a non-increasing sorting
of their channel gains, i.e. we assume that ‖h1,0‖ > ‖h2,0‖ >
. . . , ‖hK,0‖. We consider a serial interference cancellation
5(SIC) receiver wherein detection of the symbol from the k-
th user is made according to the following rule
b̂k(p) = sign

dTk

y(p)−∑
j<k
0∑
i=−2
√
pj b̂j(p+ i)hj,i



 .
(24)
Accordingly, if past decisions are correct, users that are
detected later enjoy a considerable reduction of multiple access
interference, and indeed the SINR for user k, under the
assumption of correcteness of past decisions, is written as
γk =
pk(d
T
k hk,0)
2
ζk
, (25)
with ζk = dTkMdk +
∑
j<k
pj(d
T
k hj,1)
2 +
∑
j 6=0
pk(d
T
k hk,j)
2 +
∑
j>k
1∑
i=−2
pj(d
T
k hj,i)
2
.
A. Power control and receiver design with no ISI
Replicating the path of the previous section, we start im-
posing the constraint that the receive filter be orthogonal to
the ISI subspace for each user, i.e. our decision rule is
b̂k(p) = sign

xTkOTk

y(p)−∑
j<k
0∑
i=−2
√
pj b̂j(p+ i)hj,i



 ,
(26)
and the k-th user SINR is
γk =
pk(x
T
kO
T
k hk,0)
2
̺k
, (27)
with ̺k = xTkO
T
kMOkxk +
∑
j<k
pj(x
T
kO
T
k hj,1)
2 +
∑
j>k
1∑
i=−2
pj(x
T
kO
T
k hj,i)
2
. Given receiver (26) and the SINR
expression (27), we consider here the problem of utility
maximization with respect to the transmit power, and receiver
vectors x1, . . . ,xK :
max
pk,xk
f(γk(pk,xk))
pk
, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K . (28)
The following result can be shown to hold.
Proposition 3: Let Jk be a matrix having as columns the
vectors in the set{√
pihi,1
}
i=1,...,K
⋃{√
pihi,j
}
i≥k ;j=−2,−1,0
and define Mk =
(
JkJ
T
k +M
)
; The non-cooperative
game defined in (28) admits a unique Nash equilibrium point
(p∗k,x
∗
k), for k = 1, . . . ,K , wherein
- x∗k =
√
pk(O
T
kMkOk)
−1OTk hk,0 is the unique k-th
user receive filter5 that maximizes the SINR γk given in
(27). Denote γ∗k = maxxk γk.
- p∗k = min{p¯k, Pk,max}, with p¯k the k-th user’s transmit
power such that the k-th user’s maximum SINR γ∗k equals
5Uniqueness here means up to a positive scaling factor.
γ¯, i.e. the unique solution of the equation f(γ) = γf ′(γ),
with f ′(γ) the derivative of f(γ).
Proof: The proof is omitted due to lack of space.
B. Power control and unconstrained receiver design
Finally, we consider the case in which no constraint is
imposed on the receive filter, so that the k-th user’s SINR
is written as in (25), and the decision rule is given by (24).
We now consider the following maximization
max
Sk
uk = max
pk,dk
uk(pk,dk) = max
pk
f
(
max
dk
γk(pk,dk)
)
pk
,
(29)
∀k = 1, . . . ,K . Now, denoting by d¯k the maximizer of γk, it
is easy to show that
d¯k =
√
pkM
−1
k hk,0 ; (30)
let us denote by γ¯k(pk) the k-th user’s SINR as dk = d¯k.
Maximizing the utility with respect to the transmit power
requires instead solving the equation
f(γ¯k(pk)) = f
′(γ¯k(pk))γ¯
′
k(pk)pk . (31)
Now, (31) is formally equivalent to (21) and is quite com-
plicated to manage. Accordingly, the same considerations of
Section III.C apply here as well, and, supported by extensive
computer simulations, we conjecture the existence of a unique
Nash equilibrium. We thus have the following
Conjecture 2: The non-cooperative game defined in (29)
admits a unique Nash equilibrium point (p∗k,d
∗
k), for k =
1, . . . ,K , wherein
- d∗k is given by Eq. (30), which maximizes the user k SINR
γk in (25). Denote γ¯k = maxdk γk.
- p∗k = min{p¯k, Pk,max}, with p¯k the unique solution of
Eq. (31).
Also in this case, the equilibrium can be reached through an
iterative procedure. For a given set of users’ transmit powers,
the receiver filter coefficients can be set equal to the receiver
in (30); each user can then tune its power to p∗k, and these
steps are repeated until convergence is reached.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider now an uplink DS/CDMA system with pro-
cessing gain N = 7, and assume that the packet length is
B = 120. Users may have random positions with a distance
from the AP ranging from 10m to 500m. The channel impulse
response ck(t) for the generic k-th user is assumed to be equal
to ck(t) =
3∑
ℓ=1
αk,ℓδ(t − τk,ℓ) , ∀k = 1, . . . ,K with τk,ℓ
such that τk + τk,ℓ is uniformly distributed in [0, Tb] and αk,ℓ
is a Rayleigh distributed random variate with mean equal to
d−2k iℓ, with dk being the distance of user k from the AP, and
[i1, i2, i3] = [0.5, 0.3, 0.2] . For the thermal noise level, we
take N0 = 10−9W/Hz, while the maximum allowed power
Pk,max is 25dB. We present here results of averaging over
65000 independent realizations for the users locations, fading
channel coefficients and set of spreading codes.
Figs. 1 - 2 report the achieved average utility (measured
in bits/Joule) and the average user transmit power for the
proposed non-cooperative games. As expected, the power
control game with matched filter at the receiver is the one
with the poorest performance, while the best performance
is attained by the non-linear decision-feedback receivers. It
is seen that for K > N the average utility achieved by
the non-linear receivers is twice the average utility achieved
by the linear receivers. Moreover, constrained receivers are
outperformed by unconstrained receivers, even though the gap
is not that large.
Fig. 3 reports the average fraction of users that transmit at
the maximum available power, i.e. the probability that a user
implementing a certain game is not able to achieve its target
SINR and ends up transmitting at its maximum power. As
expected, it is seen that the larger fraction corresponds to the
use of a matched filter at the receiver, while using non-linear
decision feedback receivers permits minimizing this fraction,
which, moreover, increases as the network load (i.e. number
of users) increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have considered the problem of utility
maximization in a wireless data network through the use of
a game-theoretic approach. The cross-layer issue of multiuser
receiver design and power control for utility maximization has
been considered for the practical scenario of an asynchronous,
bandlimited and multipath distorted CDMA system. The case
in which a non-linear decision feedback detector is adopted has
been considered. First we have derived the non-linear decision
feedback receiver maximizing the utility for each user; then,
we have shown how the use of a non-linear multiuser receiver
provides significant performance gains, especially in the case
in which the number of users is close to or larger than the
system processing gain. Overall, it can be stated that game
theory is an attractive mathematical tool that can be effectively
used for the design of utility-maximizing resource allocation
algorithms in wireless networks operating in practical scenar-
ios.
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Fig. 1. Achieved average utility versus number of active users for the
proposed noncooperative games.
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Fig. 2. Average transmit power versus number of active users for the proposed
noncooperative games.
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Fig. 3. Average fraction of users transmitting at the maximum power versus
number of active users for the proposed noncooperative games.
